On 2 September 2025, the High Court of Delhi in two separate orders dismissed pleas for bail on behalf of ten persons who stand accused by the Delhi Police of commission of terrorist acts, terror funding and conspiracy to commit terrorist acts in relation to the violence of 22, 23 and 24 February 2020 in which 54 persons were killed and 751 cases registered (First Information Reports, FIR). The ten accused were seeking bail in FIR 59/2020 registered by the Crime Branch and investigated by the Special Cell, Delhi Police.
PUDR’s fact-finding investigation into these incidents of violence in North East Delhi (following the protests and violence of December 2019 to February 2020) drew attention to (1) a constructed narrative by Delhi police to criminalize legitimate and constitutional protests and draw attention away from the violence of the police and right-wing groups, summoning and threatening of persons as part of “investigations”, and (2) the need for independent and fair investigations.
Five years on, the judicial record reflects biased and flawed investigations where the law has been an effective tool to punish.
First, FIR 59/2020 and bail. Eighteen accused face the prospect of a lengthy trial with five chargesheets filed over a period of three years, and a total of 835 witnesses listed as a part of the prosecution case. Charges are yet to be framed. Six accused are on bail.
Three of the accused (Asif Iqbal Tanha, Devangana Kalita and Natasha Narwal) were granted bail by the Delhi High Court on 15 June 2021. In this order, the High Court construed the UAPA strictly and narrowly – as is the principle of statutory interpretation of stringent penal provisions – and first considered whether the allegations in this case fall under the UAPA at all. Do the allegations presented by the investigating agency fall under the definition of a “terrorist act”? The Court held that there was no “specific, particularized, factual allegation” that would make out the ingredients of the offences under UAPA. This finding of the Court underpinned the ultimate grant of bail as the court then proceeded to consider the case as per regular principles of bail jurisprudence. But, in an appeal by the State against bail granted to Asif Iqbal Tanha and his co-accused, the Supreme Court, first in an interim order and then in the final order, held that the statutory interpretation carried out by the High Court on the application of UAPA may not be relied upon by co-accused in this case or any other matter. The Supreme Court specifically stated that: “The idea was to protect the State against use of the judgment on enunciation of law qua interpretation of the provisions of the UAPA Act in a bail matter”.
As a consequence, unlike the three co-accused granted bail, the accused now before the High Court in its 2 September 2025 judgment could not seek a similar analysis and findings. Therefore, the High Court was barred from addressing the fundamental question of whether the UAPA ought to have been invoked in the first place for anti-CAA protests.
Yet, no such bar applied to the State on the question of delay in trial. The State argued before the Delhi High Court that the instant case was not a “regular protest/riot matter” and that therefore the stringent provisions for bail under UAPA may not be diluted due to delay as has been held by the Supreme Court. In earlier cases such as three-judge bench Supreme Court decision titled Union of India v. KA Najeeb (2021), the court held that: “Once it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail”. This dictum of the court is founded on Article 21 of the Constitution and the right to accused to a speedy trial.
In this present case however, the Delhi High Court in its order notes the argument of the State on the “magnitude” of the incident, and the “earnest” efforts of the State (based apparently on the large number of chargesheet pages) and holds that therefore the trial must proceed “naturally” and not in a “hurried” manner. Therefore, even though the Court was barred from questioning the invocation of UAPA for a protest by the Supreme Court, the Court was persuaded to view lengthy and delayed proceedings as natural because of the “magnitude” of the case. In doing so, the Delhi High Court does not appear to have followed the clear dictum by the Supreme Court in KA Najeeb. Consequently, and relying on protected witness statements, delayed statements and the Supreme Court jurisprudence on limited scope of analysis of the evidence, the bail pleas were dismissed.
Second, the 2 September 2025 order may be seen in the larger context of these cases where as per reports (https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c757zl67n7wo), 80% of the completed cases (126) have resulted in acquittal or discharge of the accused. Witnesses have turned hostile, police witnesses have not been found credible by the courts and the failure of the investigating agencies have been highlighted. Therefore, the initial concern of PUDR and other civil society organisations in 2020 that the police were carrying out biased and flawed investigations to create a narrative of criminality appears to be borne out by the judicial record. It is the same police that has now secured a victory through the recent Delhi High Court order dismissing the bails and ensured continued custody of the accused.
The 2 September 2025 Delhi High Court order seriously disadvantages the accused in custody in FIR 59/2020 and other accused held under UAPA as the State seeks to further limit the rights of the accused to challenge the invocation of UAPA at the first instance AND the power of the Courts to assert the rights of the accused to a speedy trial.
The position of the State is this: the courts while considering bail will not question the application of UAPA – whether in its invocation to protests or in its practice with slow trials. The accused are condemned to prolonged incarceration and neither the slow pace of the trial NOR the improper application of a law such as UAPA is to be considered by the court. This is a strong assertion against the primacy of Article 21 of the Constitution noted in KA Najeeb. On 2 September, the Delhi High Court agreed in a concerning judicial order.
Paramjeet Singh and Harish Dhawan
(Secretaries)
